Living in Interesting Times: The Economics of a Chinese Currency Attack by Haymond, Jeffrey E.
Cedarville University
DigitalCommons@Cedarville
Business Administration Faculty Publications School of Business Administration
Winter 2008
Living in Interesting Times: The Economics of a
Chinese Currency Attack
Jeffrey E. Haymond
Cedarville University, jhaymond@cedarville.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/
business_administration_publications
Part of the International Business Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the Centennial Library. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@cedarville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haymond, Jeffrey E., "Living in Interesting Times: The Economics of a Chinese Currency Attack" (2008). Business Administration
Faculty Publications. 17.
http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/business_administration_publications/17
Haymond.indd   84 12/17/08   1:19:37 PM
Living in Interesting Times 
The Economics of a Chinese Currency Attack 
Jeffrey E. Haymond, Colonel, USAF 
What really matters . . . is the strength of the currency. Britain has nu­
clear weapons, but the pound is weak, so everyone pushes it around. 
—John F. Kennedy 
Several large near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, have 
amassed large levels of dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves. This 
raises concern that these states could deliberately sell off assets to harm the 
dollar’s value. Currency attacks have historically been a part of warfare, 
and the recent advent of nation-states that have large reserves suggests it 
is possible the United States could face this threat. Contemporary public 
discussion has often lacked depth and been at one of two extremes: either 
(1) China could destroy the United States if it chose to sell off its treasuries, 
or (2) the Chinese would lose so much they would never undertake a 
currency attack. This article takes a detailed look at China’s economy to 
determine the plausibility of a currency attack against the United States. 
There are many conflating economic issues surrounding a currency at­
tack, such as the perceived overvaluation of the dollar and its status as the 
world’s primary reserve currency. The analysis herein suggests that large 
dollar reserves are sufficient to enable a currency attack, independent of 
the valuation of the dollar or its status as the world’s reserve currency. The 
economic reasons for China to hold large foreign exchange reserves are 
central to our conclusions; these are found to be independent of any mali­
cious intent towards the US dollar. 
A currency attack on the dollar is plausible, with possible devastating 
effects if not effectively countered. However, an attack is extremely improb­
able due to the costs an attacker would face and can be effectively countered 
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with adequate preparations. Given the speed of modern financial markets, 
these preparations must be made in advance; it is doubtful an ad hoc 
response would be either a sufficient or an effective deterrent. 
As Chinese imports to the United States have dramatically risen, the value 
of China’s currency is increasingly contentious, with Congress periodically 
threatening trade sanctions unless China’s currency, the renminbi (“people’s 
currency”), is revalued.1 While the renminbi’s value is controversial due to 
its alleged impact on US jobs and trade deficit, another currency issue is 
emerging as perhaps even more serious: the large dollar-denominated re­
serves held by China’s central bank, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC), 
could be sold in an attack on the US dollar. China’s state media refer to 
this as the “nuclear option,” and it has even President Bush talking. He is 
not alone; the subject can yield over 2.5 million hits on Google.2 Yet find­
ing a rigorous analysis is difficult; most discussions resort to a superficial 
“that would never happen” or “China could destroy us.” This article ad­
dresses that shortcoming by providing an economic review of a currency 
attack and what can be done to prevent one. 
Sterilization ensures that dollars coming into China do not lead to 
inflation. As Chinese exporters receive dollars in exchange for goods, 
they are required to deposit those with a state bank, which the PBOC 
purchases with renminbi. To avoid the renminbi being used by the 
banks as additional reserves (which would expand the money supply 
and lead to inflation), the PBOC sells “sterilization” bonds to the 
banks to soak up the excess liquidity. This process is used by many of 
the Asian tigers to prevent their currencies from rising against the 
dollar without creating widespread internal inflation. 
The issues of currency manipulation and attack are related; the proc­
ess of sterilization used by China to avoid currency appreciation leads the 
PBOC to hold large dollar reserves, which could be used to attack the 
value of the dollar. Chinese investment in dollar assets lowers US interest 
rates but increases US dependence on foreigners.3 While Japan has held 
large dollar reserves for quite some time, it is a US ally. The last decade’s 
commodity boom and dramatic growth of East Asia, in concert with re­
duced US savings, has driven near-peer competitors, such as Russia and 
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China, to acquire large dollar denominated foreign exchange (FX) reserves 
as well. The dollar would be significantly pressured if China, Russia, or the 
Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) countries decided to sell their dollar 
FX reserves or sovereign wealth fund (SWF)4 dollar assets in favor of al­
ternative reserves (euro, yen, etc.). 
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Figure 1. Foreign exchange reserves. Capturing FX data accurately is notoriously difficult, 
as many states consider it a state secret. Further, official reserves often are only partially in 
dollars (estimated 60–70%). The data presented here were obtained from a variety of online 
sources, including the IMF, US Treasury, and China’s SAFE (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange), and should be mainly used in a qualitative sense. These data should be sufficient 
for the purpose intended—simply to show the significant growth in the last few years that in 
absolute terms would enable a currency attack. Further, the one datum point shown for GCC 
countries includes SWF assets. 
Historically, the most effective currency attack arguably occurred during 
the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 when, for a variety of reasons, both Britain 
and France were interested in taking over the canal and causing problems 
for Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser.5 They joined forces with Israel 
and attacked Egypt in October 1956. The United States, however, was 
against this action and instead pushed for a peaceful resolution to the con­
flict. It led a vote in the United Nations demanding withdrawal, and the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank began quietly selling pounds. The Soviet 
Union also hinted at selling reserves, and Britain’s reserves quickly began 
to dwindle. Not only was Britain unable to convince the United States to 
cease pressuring the pound, the United States also would not even allow 
Britain access to its own reserves on deposit at the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Faced with no good options, Britain agreed to a cease-fire 
and the crisis was over. The United States forced Britain to abandon its 
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goals in Egypt by attacking its currency, a discreet move that quickly accom­
plished its objective. Still, an attack on the dollar would be different, given 
the size of the US economy and the dollar’s world reserve currency status. 
Yet, the advent of states accruing large dollar reserves may make a currency 
attack against the United States a viable tool of economic statecraft. 
America’s enemies see dollar vulnerability leading to American decline. 
Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez 
have repeatedly lobbied OPEC to cease pricing oil in dollars, with Chavez 
boasting, “Naturally, by the crash of the dollar, America’s empire will 
crash.”6 Former US comptroller general David Walker notes that many 
countries with large FX reserves are not allies and could act against US 
interests.7 Former treasury secretary Lawrence Summers calls this a “bal­
ance of terror,” since both the United States and China could significantly 
damage the other by changing the status quo.8 
China is often the straw man threat in future-conflict scenarios, with 
some foundation. China’s rapid growth, increasing military spending, and 
need for strategic resources suggest that it will have the power and poten­
tially the appetite for future conflict. Then there is Taiwan. Yet there is 
promise that with careful engagement, China could become a construc­
tive world leader. Nonetheless, this article focuses primarily on China’s 
potential to initiate a currency attack. China has the largest dollar reserves 
and is likely to continue as an economic flashpoint as long as global trade 
imbalances persist. 
The probability of a currency attack on the dollar is low but plausible, 
and if not effectively countered, potentially devastating. Further, action 
now could minimize the impact. To reach these conclusions, the nature of 
a currency attack is reviewed in the next section, to include discussion of 
many conflating economic issues (reserve currency status, overvaluation 
of the dollar, etc.). Subsequent sections summarize how and why a state 
might conduct a currency attack, other large-dollar-holding states’ reac­
tions to an attack, and possible actions the United States could take to 
minimize the impact. 
Fundamentals of a Currency Attack 
Taiwanese elections were widely seen as a referendum on indepen­
dence, with China threatening “grave consequences” for Taiwan 
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with any unilateral declaration. In response, the US pre-positioned 
two carrier task forces in the region, and quietly told China that any 
disagreements must be solved through peaceful negotiation. China 
warned the US not to interfere in domestic Chinese issues . . . 
A review of currency theory basics will assist in understanding how a 
sale of large dollar reserves may harm the United States. The US dollar 
has a flexible exchange rate—the government allows market forces to deter­
mine the dollar’s value. While the United States rarely intervenes in cur­
rency markets, there are limits to a true market price—both internal and 
external. Internally, the Federal Reserve must keep one eye on the dollar 
in conducting monetary policy; too low a dollar could stoke inflationary 
expectations. Externally, the value of a currency is always “against what,” 
and competing currencies are often managed carefully. 
For example, the dollar’s exchange rate in terms of yen is not a pure 
market result since the Japanese government manages the yen’s value in 
some trading range to support its export economy. The dollar’s value is 
determined primarily by US trade and financial flows, and like any price, 
is a function of supply and demand. In the long run, trade flows are the 
primary factor in currency valuation.9 While price-level effects explain 
With flexible exchange rates, a state’s currency is actively traded against 
other currencies in markets to determine its value. A flexible exchange 
rate allows a country to have an independent monetary policy. With 
fixed (or pegged) exchange rates, a currency’s value is fixed against 
some standard (gold, another currency, or a basket of currencies) by 
government purchase or sale of its currency. A country must keep suf­
ficient reserves to buy its currency if necessary to maintain the peg. 
Monetary policy must support the value of the peg and is not inde­
pendent. Most previous currency crises occurred when a country’s ex­
change rate was fixed but monetary policy supported domestic objec­
tives (e.g., to stimulate growth) rather than maintaining the peg. These 
conflicting objectives forced the government to exhaust its reserves at­
tempting to maintain the official exchange rate. When the reserves are 
gone, devaluation is the only option. 
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much of long-run currency valuation, other explanatory factors include a 
state’s preferences for domestic goods over foreign goods, its trade policies, 
and its productivity. In the short run (which may be for several years), a 
currency’s value is mainly determined by financial flows, which are driven 
by investment rates of return. Theory suggests the only difference between 
countries’ interest rates is due to expected changes in the exchange rate 
over the time horizon of the investment (for similar risk levels).10 Chang­
ing expectations allow long-run factors to come back into play; when trade 
policies change or trade balances are different than expected or productivity 
jumps or slumps, expectations of the future exchange rate change. In the 
short run, therefore, a currency’s value is determined by (1) changes in 
interest rate differentials or (2) changes in expected future currency value 
(driven by long-term factors). 
How the dollar would respond to a fire sale of US assets is related to 
its underlying value when attacked. If overvalued, a large sale would 
tend to rapidly accelerate the underlying pressures for a new equilibrium 
and could result in large swings in the currency’s value. Conversely, an 
The law of one price suggests that any identical commodity should 
trade at the same price in all locations (after adjustment for transpor­
tation and transaction costs) and is the starting point for understand­
ing currency valuation. For example, if a Coke costs one dollar in the 
United States but only 0.5 euros in Europe, then the exchange rate 
should be $2/euro, or €0.5/dollar. If the dollar’s exchange rate actu­
ally were $3/euro, there would be an opportunity to profit by buying 
Cokes in the United States and shipping them to Europe (abstracting 
from shipping and transaction costs). The excess supply of Cokes pro­
duced in Europe would only be eliminated when the exchange rate 
returned to $2/euro. In the overall economy, this becomes the theory 
of purchasing power parity (PPP), which extends the law of one 
price to all prices by comparing price levels. Yet, while PPP can be 
evoked to partially explain long-term currency values, it is almost use­
less as a short-run or day-to-day predictor. See Frederic S. Mishkin, 
The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 5th ed. 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1998), 171. 
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undervalued currency would see significantly less depreciation. Despite 
the dollar’s recent sharp fall, the United States may still be vulnerable. 
In one noteworthy study of industrialized countries that experienced a 
balance-of-payments crisis, the crisis began after the adjustment process 
was already underway.11 Even absent any fundamental imbalance, a large 
sale of dollar reserves could cause a sharp adjustment. 
One interesting stylized fact concerning flexible exchange rates is that 
they may stay within some narrow band or trend for long periods of time 
and then adjust sharply to a new band or trend. The dollar’s value might 
be strong for quite some time, like the early ’80s, and then suddenly 
change course, as occurred in the latter ’80s. This lack of smooth adjust­
ment suggests the dollar could be fundamentally misvalued for quite a 
while, and when the market does correct, it does so dramatically. Rapid 
currency changes can cause large adjustments in the real economy as market 
participants are forced to adapt. Many currency crashes have occurred sud­
denly, even when contemporary theorists had warned that fundamentals 
necessitated an exchange rate correction.12 Given the reality of govern­
ment intervention in currency markets, it is not surprising to see such 
sharp adjustments.13 
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Figure 2. Major currency dollar index 
As the US current account (CA) exploded to over 6 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2006, many economists concluded the dollar 
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was overvalued and needed to depreciate to reach a sustainable CA balance 
(commonly thought to be ~3 percent of GDP). Large trade deficits leave 
foreigners with more dollars than they might want to hold in their port­
folios. As they sell dollars to rebalance their portfolios, the dollar’s value 
goes down. How overvalued the currency is depends on the assumptions 
made,14 and estimates of required depreciation can vary widely—between 
15 and 50 percent in real terms.15 It is not clear yet from the dollar’s large 
fall in 2007 whether it will stabilize or go lower, as the effects on trade only 
occur with a lag. If the dollar were overvalued, it would exacerbate the ef­
fects of a currency attack. Moreover, the recommendations for solving the 
current trade imbalances are all appropriate to mitigate risk of and damage 
from a currency attack. 
The current account, the financial account, and the capital account 
make up the balance of payments and sum to zero, by definition. If a 
state has a CA deficit, it must have a capital and/or financial account 
surplus. 
Current Account + Financial Account + Capital Account = 0 
In practice, the United States has large CA deficits due to its poor 
balance of trade, which is by far the largest component of the current 
account. 
CA = Balance of Trade + Net Factor Income from Abroad 
+ Net Unilateral Transfers 
Dollars flow from the United States to purchase foreign-made prod­
ucts, such as oil or manufactured goods. The dollars return in the 
capital and/or financial account as foreign investors purchase US se­
curities and make investments in US assets, keeping the balance of 
payments equal to zero. 
Some fear a currency attack could precipitate a run on the dollar and 
endanger its role as the world’s reserve currency. Several factors enable a 
currency to serve as a reserve currency. First, it should be widely used for 
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Winter 2008 [ 91 ] 
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exchange of goods and services. Since most states want access to the large 
US domestic market, they need dollars to facilitate trade. Second, a re­
serve currency should come from a country (or countries) that have deep 
and liquid financial markets to provide a safe return on reserves. Finally, 
a fiat reserve currency is ideally backed by a government with a history of 
protecting its value and a politically independent central bank. 
The dollar’s dramatic drop in value since 2002 is seen by some as proof 
that its days as a reserve currency are numbered, but one must consider 
the long-run perspective and the potential competitors. The most likely 
competitor, the euro, has large and deep financial markets and trades with 
much of the world. But it is not backed by any government and has no 
long history—not even a history to include a full boom/bust cycle where 
internal friction over policy could arise. The euro is increasingly a share 
of other states’ currency reserves, but that share is still relatively small.16 
Further, as long as the United States is a large global trading partner, there 
will be demand for dollars to facilitate trade. Finally, many common fears 
of loss of reserve currency are overblown—the principle benefit to the 
United States is the interest savings associated with seignorage, and that 
amount is less than commonly believed. 
Seignorage can be thought of as the amount of interest that a govern­
ment would have to pay for the amount of currency it has outstanding; 
the more physical dollars people are willing to hold, the less T-bills a gov­
ernment has to pay interest on. Estimates of the interest savings associ­
ated with seignorage are ~ $25 billion per year—no small amount, but in 
a $13-trillion economy is less than commonly believed (and, of course, 
not all currency is foreign held). So to the extent foreigners are willing to 
hold physical US currency, the United States benefits from seignorage. 
Contemporary concern over currency attack may be heightened since 
most financial crises of the last two decades were currency related. Yet those 
countries that suffered a crisis had a currency mismatch—their assets were 
denominated in their own currency, but their liabilities were denominated 
in others (usually dollars). When these countries had problems, nervous 
investors would withdraw their capital in dollars, unless prohibited by 
capital controls. Once a country’s reserves were low enough, speculators 
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would begin to bet on devaluation, and a crisis would be just a matter of 
time. The US situation is radically different, as it has the “exorbitant privi­
lege” of borrowing and paying back in its own currency.17 
Implementing a Currency Attack 
Despite China’s attempt to intimidate Taiwan, voters overwhelmingly 
endorsed independence. It was less than a week until intelligence indi­
cated China’s missiles were being prepared to launch. When US naval 
forces moved in response on Sunday, markets across the world saw 
unprecedented selling of US T-bills on Monday . . . 
Conceptually a currency attack is easy to understand. If an attacker 
holds $100 million in US treasuries, it could sell those in any major fi­
nancial market, deposit the cash dollar proceeds in a bank, and exchange 
the dollar-denominated bank deposits for bank deposits denominated in 
any other currency. Since all prices are determined on the margin, small 
changes in the amount sold can result in dramatically varying prices, de­
pending upon the elasticity of demand. Even if the demand for dollars is 
very elastic, enough dollar sales could cause large swings in value. Indeed, 
the threat of dollar sales by a Chinese communist party official in 2007 led 
to a sharp drop in the dollar’s value.18 
What would be the real effect of a dramatic fall in the value of the dollar? 
While Americans are feeling that pain now with higher oil prices, a broader 
review shows less effect. Many exporters to the United States are unwilling 
to lose market share and will accept smaller profits when the dollar falls. The 
Federal Reserve estimates a fairly low pass-though rate of currency deprecia­
tion to the inflation rate.19 Furthermore, imports are less than 20 percent 
of American GDP, limiting the overall effect. If the dollar’s value were to 
remain low longer term, expenditure switching would result in a decrease 
of US consumption, while US exports would increase. Also, the first-order 
effects of a currency attack may be temporary in nature, especially if the 
dollar were fundamentally in balance prior to an attack. The Bank for Inter­
national Settlements reports that as of 2007, daily dollar transactions of all 
types equaled $2.7 trillion, with cross-border claims equaling $30 trillion 
and total financial derivatives at $500 trillion!20 
The most plausible scenario for a currency attack to result in significant 
negative impact is based on market reaction. Market psychology is diffi-
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cult to predict, but previous market dislocation experience suggests the 
reaction could be significant.21 Further, the reaction would be away from 
US treasuries, opposite the usual direction. Market participants would set 
Expenditure switching occurs when a state whose currency appreci­
ates (and imports become relatively cheaper) consumes more imports 
and exports less (since its exports cost relatively more). A state whose 
currency depreciates will see the opposite effect. 
off on a mad scramble for alternative safe liquid assets, and the yen, the 
euro, and gold would likely see strong increases in demand. Global eco­
nomic concerns would rise, as Europe and Japan would not be in favor of 
significantly stronger currencies.22 It would be very possible to see a crash 
in world markets, with expensive markets taking the worst hit. The real 
fear is if there are contagion effects. Extreme scenarios are possible, similar 
to the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 
1998, as a dollar crash is likely not factored into market models. While 
growth in global dollar trading somewhat mitigates the possible damage 
of a currency attack, some of the largest increase comes in dollar deriva­
tives, which are growing 20 percent annually.23 A dislocation in the dollar 
market could result in significant losses; it is unclear how sound the 
counterparties to derivative contracts are in the wake of unprecedented 
losses.24 If they are unable to meet their responsibilities, there is a possibility 
of cascading cross-defaults, with consequent market meltdown. 
Counterparties is simply the other party opposite a hedge. For example, if 
you buy a put option to sell 100 shares of IBM, the person that sold the put 
is a counterparty. There is some risk that should you decide to exercise that 
option, the individual may not have the resources to purchase your 100 
shares of IBM. While there are many protections for simple options, more 
complex derivatives have less oversight and more risk—with many times the 
leverage employed. Successful hedging of risk is dependent upon the ability 
of the counterparty to meet its obligation. 
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Potential Attackers—Why They Might Do It 
While daily currency trading normally exceeded $3 trillion, the mar­
ginal increase of $300B on Monday caused a 5% drop in the value of 
the dollar, and interest rates rose a full point in longer-dated maturities. 
Rumors began to fly; obviously the Chinese were selling. But would the 
GCC countries try to sell in advance of a full-on dollar crisis? 
Why would a state ever attack another country’s currency? A broad an­
swer is simply that it must believe an attack is the lowest-cost method to 
achieve a given objective and that the benefits exceed the cost. So what are 
China’s costs to attack the dollar? The most obvious is that if China sold 
its dollar assets precipitously, it would receive fire sale returns on its in­
vestment and suffer huge losses, which might well harm China more than 
the United States. If China considered only profit and loss calculations, 
it would never take this action. Although states rationally optimize their 
behavior, the leadership of a state will have other considerations than sim­
ply maximizing profit. A state will equate marginal political and economic 
losses; to suffer a large economic loss associated with initiating a currency 
attack, the alternative political cost must be similar.25 What political goal 
is worth it to China? Only its leadership would know; perhaps Taiwan?  
To understand other costs that China must consider, we must appreci­
ate why it has such large dollar reserves. When China began opening up in 
the late 1970s, it needed foreign exchange and technology; the preferred 
method to acquire these was through foreign direct investment (FDI).26 
The Latin American crisis of the early ’80s heavily influenced Chinese 
thought; Chinese leadership subsequently demanded that Chinese com­
panies balance their FX expenditures with their own FX revenues. Re­
peated global currency crises in the ’80s and ’90s showed the value of 
having large FX reserves, and China responded with policies that gained 
additional reserves. China began its peg to the dollar in 1994, largely in 
response to previous inflations that rocked its internal economy. Hong 
Kong pegged to the dollar in 1983 with very successful results, so a dollar 
peg seemed a natural way to stabilize. At the time, China did not have 
large CA surpluses; it was just as likely to import US capital equipment 
as to export. While China’s economy grew robustly throughout the 1990s 
and subsequently, it was not until 2004 that CA surpluses started amassing 
at large rates (along with its dollar reserves). Prior to 2002, the expectation 
of currency change for China was in only one direction—depreciation.27 
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Yet 2003 and 2004 saw marked increases in China’s balance of payment 
surpluses (capital account and current account); these surpluses have per­
sisted even after the 2005 revaluation of the renminbi against the dollar. 
The magnitude of these surpluses ($360 billion in 2007) requires large 
intervention by the PBOC on an almost daily basis to maintain the value 
of the renminbi.28 As China receives dollars in exchange for its exports, 
the industries are required to deposit them with Chinese banks, which 
the PBOC then purchases with renminbi. To avoid the inflationary result 
of the renminbi, the PBOC raises bank reserve requirements and issues 
sterilization bonds to soak up the excess liquidity. China engages in steri­
lization to manage its growth as it struggles to shed inefficient state-run 
industries without causing mass unemployment that would accompany 
the operation of true market forces.29 
Nonetheless, the result of this process is not in China’s long-term in­
terest. Current policies tend to favor export industries and lead to over­
development of export industries at the expense of domestic demand. This 
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Figure 3. China’s current account 
limits domestic consumption to a level below where it would normally be 
and stimulates export production at a level greater than it should be, lead­
ing to suboptimal returns. Paradoxically, this malinvestment could result 
in the market determining the renminbi is overvalued, not undervalued!30 
Further, sterilization delays the necessary inflation (or real exchange rate 
appreciation) China requires, forcing the beleaguered banking system to 
hold underperforming assets. Chinese economists lament that China pays 
high returns to obtain US FDI while receiving very low returns on its 
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US treasury investments.31 Many analysts note this can only continue 
as long as the returns on US treasuries exceed what the PBOC must pay 
on its sterilization bonds; yet recent US interest rate cuts by the Federal 
Reserve have inverted this, forcing the Chinese, in effect, to pay to loan 
the United States money (on top of losses associated with dollar depre­
ciation)! Since many of the PBOC’s liabilities are non-interest bearing, 
it is still profitable on a cash flow basis although its implied capital losses 
exceed current interest income.32 Clearly at some point, the Chinese will 
be forced to stop this policy.33 China appears to be recognizing the costs 
of its current policy; the creation of the China Investment Corporation as 
a sovereign wealth fund is an implicit acknowledgement that China has 
sufficient reserves and should manage them more efficiently.34 In addi­
tion, China requires reserves to deal with the recapitalization of its state-run 
banking system, which is known to be saddled with huge loan losses from 
state-run industries.35 
With this background, we see that China has large dollar reserves (1) as 
a buffer against financial crises, (2) as the necessary counterpart to large 
current account/capital account surpluses, (3) because of capital controls, 
and (4) to facilitate banking system reform.36 All these factors lead China 
to favor FDI supporting export industries. Consideration of the costs to 
China of a currency attack must include the implications to these objec­
tives. First, China would be forced to suspend its dollar peg or suffer the 
same whipsaw effect it intended for the United States.37 It is not clear 
how markets would respond to this, but it is clear that it would increase 
instability—something known to be abhorred by Chinese leadership. Sec­
ond, China’s overarching economic goal is to transition employment away 
from inefficient state-run industries towards export industries. Economic 
conflict with the United States would derail this important objective, as 
exports would be reduced (certainly to the United States). Further, a cur­
rency attack would almost certainly reduce FDI in China, especially if a 
financial contagion developed. Thus, a currency attack would not only 
eliminate China’s dollar reserve position at a huge loss, it would also deny 
China the “insurance policy” of reserves to protect against crisis—an 
economic crisis that might very well occur with a currency attack on 
the dollar. Given China’s careful crafting of reserves and how deeply it 
abhors internal instability, the probability of a currency attack seems 
extremely remote. 
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Beyond China:  Reactions to a Currency Attack 
Japan and the UK suffered huge losses in their dollar reserve portfolio. 
Japan’s ambassador suggested to the US Treasury secretary that they 
could not suffer further losses, and would take whatever action 
necessary . . . . 
How would other large dollar holders react to a currency attack or the 
threat of one? First consider Japan, which has ~$1 trillion in dollar-
denominated reserves. What would it do? Selling would be very difficult, 
as that might precipitate a dollar run and destroy its portfolio’s value. 
Would it buy? This is heavily influenced by the dollar’s fundamental value. 
Are we in a stable, long-term equilibrium that a currency attack is only 
temporarily perturbing? If that were the case, many buyers would appear 
to take advantage of artificially low prices. If not, Japan, the UK, and others 
would still have an interest in preserving their portfolios’ values; they may 
be willing to add to their positions to halt a dollar run. 
Other actors to consider include Russia and the GCC countries, which 
are not traditional allies and could act in ways that are either stabilizing 
or destabilizing. From an economic calculus, they would want to preserve 
the value of the foreign exchange; they face the same considerations as 
the UK and Japan. However, it may be in their political interest to either 
hurt or help the United States when it is down. For instance, Russia has 
become increasingly belligerent as its fortunes have risen with commodity 
wealth. Dollar hegemony is emblematic of US hegemony in many respects; 
an attack on the dollar could reduce American influence worldwide and 
thereby further Russia’s own national interest. Russia has already switched 
to a reserve basket with euros and dollars; it could certainly change the 
percentage in favor of euros at an unhelpful time. While Russia could lose 
money with a fire sale approach, two factors mitigate this loss. First, Rus­
sia has significantly less dollar reserves than China, so if it sold first Russia 
might be able to sell a larger portion before suffering serious capital losses. 
Second, Russia does not have China’s level of structural dependency on 
the US consumer for its commodity exports. 
While initial world reaction would likely blame China for the attack, as 
the economic implications began being felt worldwide, the United States 
could receive blame for its policies which created the large dollar debt. 
Had the United States kept its house in order, so the thinking may go, 
this would never have happened. It is possible that anti-American senti­
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ment may rise globally, potentially hindering cooperative response to the 
crisis. While this analysis is speculative, it nonetheless suggests that any 
responses requiring international coordination need to be prepared in ad­
vance; it may be more difficult to achieve agreement in the aftermath of 
any attack. 
Currency Attack Responses 
Global stock markets began plunging; rumors suggested several large 
funds had engaged in dollar carry trades, and heavily leveraged this bet. 
The 10% drop in the dollar was forcing liquidation of assets, including 
equities.With the weakness in the dollar and equity markets worldwide, 
the Euro shot up over 25% in one day, and Gold went above $3000/oz 
for the 1st time.Wednesday saw stock futures down 30% in the US and 
more in other global markets. A financial contagion was in work; none 
of the quantitative models had assumed this 6-sigma event . . . . 
A currency attack is improbable but threatens potentially devastating 
results—if the attack is allowed to disrupt financial markets such that a 
contagion results. Yet given the large, deep markets in US treasuries, the 
United States can develop strategies to minimize the effect of large, simul­
taneous dollar sales.38 There are at least three broad strategies to prevent or 
mitigate a currency attack, discussed below from the easiest to implement 
to the hardest. There is also a common theme; these strategies should be 
implemented immediately, as the speed of modern financial markets may 
not allow an ad hoc currency attack defense. 
Internal US Coordination 
First, the US government must prepare for a currency attack, to include 
exercising representative scenarios in a revised National Security Council 
(NSC) interagency crisis planning process. Scenarios should flesh out co­
ordination between the DoD, the Treasury, the intelligence community, 
and the Federal Reserve, at a minimum. This coordination should cement 
information flow processes as well as war-gaming the specific responses 
and timing required to implement. For instance, which financial markets 
could be disrupted (locations and types), and which could be used to de­
fend? Which agency interfaces with which market? What types of controls 
might be effective? Outright market closure (how long?)? Circuit breakers 
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Winter 2008 [ 99 ] 
Haymond.indd   100 12/17/08   1:19:43 PM
Jeffrey E. Haymond 
(what thresholds?)? How would the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
jointly act?39 Second, scenarios should be developed for differing threat 
countries. The internal impact on some attacking states is drastically dif­
ferent from others; likewise, the magnitude of the threat. The United 
States clearly cannot have a one-size-fits-all currency attack response. 
External Coordination 
Japan, the EU, the UK, and other large dollar holders have a vested in­
terest in helping the United States defeat a currency attack; we should en­
ter into formal arrangements to handle “extreme” currency movements.40 
Japan will not want the capital value of its dollar holdings destroyed and 
will not want the yen to rise appreciably, nor will it want to see China 
gain further regional prominence. The EU will not want to see the euro 
appreciate significantly and will likely have some concern over Chinese 
hostility toward Taiwan. The UK is a traditional ally and a holder of large 
amounts of dollar-denominated assets; on both counts it will likely sup­
port the United States. Most nations will not find it in their interest to see 
the world’s reserve currency in freefall. 
US Structural Reforms 
The United States should work towards eliminating existing global im­
balances, beginning with the orderly adjustment of the dollar to a level 
that can be sustained over the longer term. Several factors can assist in this 
adjustment. First, the United States does not typically engage in direct 
currency manipulation, yet many of its trading partners do. The United 
States should engage these partners to end such manipulation. To the ex­
tent that markets determine the dollar’s value, the less painful will be the 
necessary structural reforms. 
The United States must also make other changes to its balance of pay­
ments. The US CA deficit is historically high and at levels that have led to 
currency crises in other countries (> 5 percent of GDP). While the dollar’s 
world reserve currency status has postponed a crisis heretofore, the longer 
the United States waits to adjust, the more painful it will be. Existing CA 
imbalances are offset by capital and financial account surpluses, as must be 
the case in balance-of-payment accounting.41 Foreign central banks have 
accumulated large dollar reserves, in part because the United States is­
sued vast amounts of debt to finance deficit spending. If the United States 
weans off deficit spending, it would eliminate the primary source of dollar 
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accumulation and minimize the difficulties to US government operations 
should an attack occur. Mitigation of currency attack risk is yet another 
sound reason for the United States to get its fiscal house in order. 
Further, the United States should implement policies to increase its pri­
vate savings rate in addition to increasing public savings. By definition, a 
current account deficit must equal the difference between a country’s in­
vestment and its national savings (the sum of public and private savings). 
If the United States wants to maintain a high level of investment and re­
duce its CA deficit, it must increase national savings. The US private sav­
ings rate went negative in 2005 and has hovered around zero since. There 
are many analyses as to why, including some that suggest that the low 
savings rate may not be a problem.42 Without debating the proper meas­
urement of the private savings rate or the causes of today’s low rates, one 
can still see an obvious truth: if the United States consumes more than it 
produces, someone else is making up the difference and is building dollar 
reserves that could be used in a currency attack. Both fiscal and monetary 
policies should be adjusted to encourage private savings.43 
Conclusion 
We are now living in the long run. In contrast to the “deficits don’t mat­
ter” mantra, run fiscal decisions that sent large dollar debt overseas are 
now resulting in major currency adjustments. The dollar’s dramatic fall 
since 2002 is manifesting itself in higher prices for food, energy, and other 
commodities, and is beginning to correct the global imbalances in trade. 
As we live with the long run consequences of our previous fiscal policies, 
we must also deal with the national security implications as well. Currency 
attacks have historically been an integral part of any war effort. The emer­
gence of states holding large dollar reserves suggests, that they could be 
factors in the future as well—we must be prepared. If a currency attack is 
not countered effectively, it could have a devastating impact on the United 
States. Nonetheless, actions can be taken now to minimize the impact, 
ensuring that the costs to the attacker would exceed any to the United 
States—turning a low probability event into a virtual zero-probability 
event. 
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